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The aim of this article is to point to the unsolved research problems connected to 
causation in the philosophy of economics. First, the paper defines causation and 
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strumentalist theory of causation. Second, it offers a review the current research 
activity focusing on the problem of causation in economics. Third, it discusses 
several case studies. On the grounds of comparison of the research practice of 
economists and the current issues undertaken by the philosophers of economics, 
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mative methodological analyses and indicate the research questions that need to be 
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1. Introduction
The goal of the article is to present the latest research on causality in the philoso-
phy of economics, and a comparison of these with the research practice of econo-
mists and the formulation of research problems that have yet to be resolved. In the 
first part, an attempt is made to briefly present the concept of causal relation (on-
tology of causality) and answer the question of how it can be known (epistemolo-
gy of causality). Causality is discussed in the light of the two popular paradigms 
of the philosophy of science: scientific realism and instrumentalism.  
The second part of the article (in section 3) presents the results of the latest 
research on the problem of causality in the philosophy of economics. Next (in 
section 4), an analysis of selected case studies with the aim of presenting examples 
to support the thesis that there is a gap between the issues analyzed based on phi-
losophy and methodology of economics, and the problems encountered by econ-
omists during research. The final section contains the conclusions from the com-
parison of the research practice of economists and problems related to the issues in 
ontology and epistemology of causality undertaken in the contemporary philoso-
phy of economics. In addition, research problems have been formulated that have 
not yet been taken up in the literature on the subject, and their analysis from 
a methodological perspective seems necessary. First, the literature review of the 
subject brought to light the lack of methodological research devoted to the de-
scription of the methods used by the economists. Second, apart from the glorious 
exception of Granger causality tests, no research has been undertaken on philo-
sophical assumptions concerning economic reality, and the nature of causal rela-
tionships that triggers the applied research methods and their grounding in the 
philosophical theories of causality. Third, the contemporary reflection by the phi-
losophers of economics over the problems of ontology and epistemology of cau-
sality in modern economics has a limited possibility for economists to apply in 
research practice. 
2. Theoretical approaches to the problem of causality
The term causal realism is used to refer to the view that cause-effect relationships 
exist in the world, outside the cognitive entity. Such an existence is well under-
stood by one of the heroes of the stories written by Milne: when asked by Winnie 
the Pooh for the North Pole, Christopher Robin responds: “is just a thing that you 
discover” (Milne, 1988, p. 111; cf. Maziarz, 2013, pp. 27–38). Realists (causal) 
argue that a causal relation between X and Y exists if and only if there are caus-
al mechanisms linking X to Y. Little (1991, p. 15) defines the concept of causal 
mechanism in social sciences as “a sequence of events, conditions, and processes 
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leading from the explanans to the explanandum.” Causal realism proposes that 
empirical evidence of causality be extended to the analysis of the mechanism of 
the postulated relation between cause and effect (Lewis-Beck, 2003, p. 100). 
The second of the opposite ways of understanding the cause-effect relation is 
to identify the causal relation with regularity. Advocates of Hume’s views, op-
posed to the view described above, believe that reality is not causal. The outside 
world simply “is” (Williamson, 2009). Therefore, causal relations are identified by 
them with empirical regularities, i.e. a correlation, model or causal graph.  
It is worth noting that the following description of the theoretical approaches 
of causality certainly does not exhaust this wide subject. The philosophers and 
scientists have contemplated causality and causal relations from the very begin-
ning of the philosophy itself (Beebee, 2009). Many definitions of the concept have 
been proposed throughout history but none has been widely accepted (Granger, 
1980). Cartwright (2006), a philosopher of science at the London School of Eco-
nomics, who points out that “each author of any definition argues that his defini-
tion is informative”. 
2.1. The realistic approach 
The basic assumption of causal realism is to recognize that causality exists, in 
reality (Esfeld, 2011), and causal relations are not only an illusion noticed by the 
observer due to the temporal sequence of events, as Hume believed. Such an ap-
proach to the phenomenon of causality by causal realism means that it cannot be 
reduced to other manifestations of reality, such as the deterministic or probabilistic 
regularity of two phenomena. 
Hence, causal realism presupposes the existence in the outside world of 
something that can be called a causal relation independent of the knowing mind. It 
is worth paying attention to the central role of causality in the reality that is the 
subject of research by scientists, which, for example, for Bhaskar (1997) was the 
essence of the studied phenomena. The second important feature of the causal 
relations, in accordance with the view presented here, is the existence of a certain 
type of necessity, e.g., the occurrence of A causes the occurrence of B (Chakra-
vartty, 2014). This view has recently been eased due to the return of interest of 
science philosophers in exact sciences (such as physics, which operates on deter-
ministic causal laws) to social sciences, where the issue of indeterminacy has been 
resolved by changing the way of understanding causal laws; these were found to 
be valid in the model and adding “ceteris paribus”, meaning that the veracity of 
the sentence stating the existence of a causal relation held only when other factors 
remained unchanged. On the other hand, Cartwright (2006) advocated an under-
standing of causal laws as a tendency (capacity). For example, according to this 
interpretation, the law of demand expresses a tendency to decrease the need for the 
considered good when its price increases. 
What is this necessity or inclination? Glennan points out that the answer to 
the above question is to indicate the mechanism, or system or process, which con-
sists of many parts, i.e., reactions between the parts of the mechanism contributing 
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to the stability and overlapping relations between the events analyzed. From his 
work on the analysis of philosophical research in causality relations, Glennan 
concluded, “discovering a mechanism is a gold standard for establishing and ex-
plaining causal connections” (Glennan, 2009). 
According to Kistler (2006), the discovery of the universal dependence is insuf-
ficient to claim that the analyzed relation is causal. It results, among others from the 
fact that universal generalizations can be accidental. Therefore, Kistler argues that 
a full understanding of the law describing the mechanism of interaction between two 
phenomena (events) is necessary to state that the analyzed relation is causal. 
In research practice, the discovery of the causative mechanism explaining the 
analyzed phenomenon is reduced to the analysis of lower levels of reality (Hardt, 
2013), i.e. theories describing more specific issues. For example, learning about 
the theory of gravity, or the mechanism of interaction between two bodies, allows 
us one to recognize that the attraction process is causative, and is not so-called, 
pseudo-process, as in the case of the shifting shadow of a tree during the day 
(Kistler, 2006). 
In summary, the study of causal phenomena in light of a realistic approach 
can be equated with the analysis of the interaction between two processes. In the 
case when the analyzed relation can be described by laws due to the recognition of 
mechanisms linking events A and B, it can be assumed that the relation is causal. 
2.2. The instrumentalist approach 
Other philosophers strongly opposed the real existence of causal relations. Many 
philosophers and scientists during the period when logical positivism was the most 
respected philosophy of science, professed the views expressed later by Bertrand 
Russell, who recognized causality as a relic of a past era that survived, like the 
monarchy, solely because it did no harm (Chakravartty, 2014). 
One of the most famous sceptics was David Hume. This eighteenth-century 
historian, who also dealt with the philosophy and methodology of social sciences, 
believed that the human mind was incapable of knowing the causal relation. In-
stead of observing such a relation, you can only see event A and the following 
event B. Hume (1739) justified his view by the fact that an observer can experi-
ence only one phenomenon at a given time. Since the relation between cause and 
effect connects two moments on the time continuum, it is impossible to get to 
know directly.  
Hoover (2006) illustrates the analysis carried out by Hume as an example of 
a game of billiards: the ball A hits the ball B and causes it to move. What conclu-
sions does the eighteenth-century historian and philosopher draw from observing 
such an event? First, causality is asymmetrical, which means that if A causes B, 
B does not cause A. From this premise, Hume deduced that the effect must pre-
cede the cause in time. Secondly, he believed that the causes were effective, which 
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meant that one should make a distinction between accidental correlation and caus-
al relationship, the feature of which is that the first element of the relationship 
produces the effect.  
Hume’s scepticism was reflected in the view that a permanent relationship be-
tween cause and effect cannot be understood in any other way than by induction 
based on observing events in a temporal order. Therefore, Hume thought that talking 
about causes was a habit of the mind rather than a reasonably logical phenomenon. 
Despite the popularization of his views, many classical economists have 
sought to analyze economic phenomena in terms of causes and effects. The most 
important were Ricardo and Mill (Maziarz, 2015). Mill (1966) proposed five 
methods of inference of causal relations from data: (i) agreement, (ii) difference, 
(iii) joint (or double) method of agreement and difference, (iv) residues and, 
(v) concomitant variations. 
The method of difference allows to determine the cause of the investigated 
phenomenon when the observer must deal with two situations: in the first case, 
a certain effect occurred, in the second case—it did not. If these situations are 
similar in all aspects except one factor, this factor is considered the cause of the 
phenomenon. 
Despite the existence of various ways of studying causality in the history of 
economics, modern econometrics urge the classical philosophers to justify their 
methods. Granger (2012), basing his argument on Hume’s deliberations, asserted 
that it was possible to draw conclusions and formulate the conditions that a rela-
tion must fulfil to deserve the name causal. Granger’s causality is characterized by 
two features: 
(1) the cause happens prior to its effect, 
(2) the cause has unique information about the future values of its effect. 
Considering the tradition of the reductionist approach to causality, which is 
equated with a permanent relationship and time sequence, Wiener (1956) pro-
posed the first definition of causality that may be used to develop methods for the 
quantitative evaluation of the occurrence of such a relationship:  
For two simultaneously measured signals, if we can predict the first signal better 
by using the past information from the second one than by using the information 
without it, then we call the second signal causal to the first one. 
On this basis, Granger (1980) proposed a definition of causality with three 
axioms. First, the past and the present may cause the future, but the reverse de-
pendence is impossible. Second, the set of all relevant information (Ώn) does not 
contain unnecessary information, i.e. in the case when some variables (Zn) are 
deterministically correlated with each other, they should be excluded from Ώn. 
Third, all causal relationships remain constant over time. On this basis, Granger 
developed his own definition of causality, which is presented below. To be able to 
apply it in the process of econometric testing in the analysis of the time series, 
a simplifying assumption should be made that  only contains the relevant varia-
bles: 
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Yn causes Xn+1 if and only if: 
  for A 
– variables suspected of being a cause and an effect
– the information available as of time t in the entire universe.
It should be emphasized that Granger’s causality tests are the only ones 
whose philosophical inspirations and assumptions have been investigated. The 
next section covers the areas of the latest research in economic philosophy devot-
ed to the problem of causation, a comparison of selected economic research, and 
identification of the unresolved research problems. 
3. Research on causality in contemporary philosophy of economics
Based on the literature review, it can be concluded that in the contemporary meth-
odology of economics, there is a lack of descriptive approaches to the methods used 
by economists to justify conclusions regarding the existence of causal relations in 
the economic reality. So far, no one has inquired what philosophical concepts and 
assumptions are at the basis of these methods. One exception is the statistical 
Granger causality tests (1969, 1980). Nor has there been any systematic study of the 
methodology currently used by economists to answer the questions raised here earli-
er. Other disciplines such as physics, chemistry, and biology that engage in the anal-
ysis of causality have been more pursuant. For example, Shadish, Cook and Camp-
bell (2002) presented the theory of cause generalization grounded in the 
methodological analysis of activities undertaken by researchers in those areas of 
science. Woodward (2003), using case studies from the social sciences and a review 
of the methodological literature, stated that causation was understood by social re-
searchers as an unchanged relation in the case of intervention. 
Methodologists and economics philosophers have primarily focused on the 
historical development of understanding causality and methods devoted to its 
cognition used by economists and their normative investigations that are not close-
ly related to the research practice of economists. Consequently, no theoretical 
framework for conducting fruitful economic studies or formulating appropriate 
recommendations for economic politicians have evolved. 
Writings aimed at presenting a review of the methods of understanding the 
causal relations used by economists, focus on the analysis of the views of philoso-
phers of economics, presenting the historical outline and discussing selected con-
temporary methods that are not widely used. For example, LeRoy (2004) empha-
sizes the essence of the graph-theoretical approach, without discussing the current 
research practice of economists. Hoover presents historical development and phil-
osophical justification of selected historical theoretical and econometric methods, 
discussing, among others, research of the Cowles Commission and understanding 
of causality by Herbert Simon (Hoover, 2006). Monographic studies analyzing the 
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epistemology of the causality of a chosen economist or one school of economic 
thought are also popular. An example of this is the work of Hammond (2005), 
who analyzed the understanding of the concept of causality and methodology used 
by Milton Friedman, the creator of monetarism. Likewise, Blaug (1992) devoted 






For normative analyzes, one can include, famous among methodologists of eco-
nomics, Cartwright’s work (2007a), which made a philosophical analysis of ontology 
and epistemology of causality and argued that investigations of causal relation were 
possible not only by means of randomized controlled trials but also by other hypothet-
ical-deductive methods, e.g., econometric models for measuring the average impact of 
an intervention on a dependent variable. Cartwright suggested that the choice of 
a method should be determined by the scope and type of knowledge about the ana-
lyzed phenomenon (2007a). Pearl (2009) presented and unified four philosophical 
approaches to causation the probabilistic, manipulative, counterfactual, and structural, 
and devises such as simple mathematical tools for studying the relationships between 
causal connections in the studied phenomena. Hoover (2001) dealt with the problem of 
causality in macroeconomics, but he analyzed not the practice of economists, but 
methodological research devoted to this problem. The exceptions to the above system-
atization of methodological research on understanding and causation in economics are 
articles devoted to these issues in behavioural economics (for example: Loewenstein, 
1999), although the normative approach is also dominant on this ground, i.e. the for-
mulation of recommendations for increasing the role of experiments in the methodolo-
gy of economics (for example, Harrison & List, 2004). 
Over the past few years there has been a significant increase in interest in the cau-
sality problem, as evidenced by the increase in the number of articles appearing in the 
important journals devoted to the problems of the philosophy of economics (among 
others “Economics and Philosophy”, “Journal of Economic Methodology”, “Econom-
ics, Politics”, “Philosophy and Economics”). However, most of the recent writings are 
normative examinations offering few applications to the research practice of econo-
mists. Grüne-Yanoff (2015), not unlike many philosophers of economics, takes 
a realist stand and argues that the justification for the decision to undertake economic 
intervention is appropriate only when it refers to causal mechanisms. LeRoy’s investi-
gations (2015) also belong to the trend of normative approaches to the problem of 
causality in the methodology of economics. He considered the features a theoretical 
model must have to allow for the deductive cognition of unchanging relationships 
under the influence of intervention (implementation-neutral causation). Cleveau and 
Mireles-Flores (2014) deserve credit for their efforts in the research on the epistemolo-
gy of causality of the recent years, and their attempt to address the question of under-
standing the concept of causality by economists based on a methodological analysis of 
the OECD study (1994) on the causes of unemployment. Cleveau and Mireles-Flores 
(2014) state that economists rarely express explicitly which philosophical causation 
theory they consider to be true and present a point of view that the question about the 
adequacy of, among others, regularity theory, probabilistic theory, counterfactual 
theory, process theory, or manipulation theory remains open. 
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4. Research practice of economists
The need to conduct research on the epistemology of causality in modern economic 
research is emphasized by the observation of economists’ practice and the lack thereof 
in the current philosophy of economics. First, methodological pluralism can be ob-
served in contemporary economic research. Economics has failed to developed a uni-
form methodology, and competitive schools of thought (research paradigms) contrib-
ute to situations where, on the basis of the same empirical data, economists come to 
different conclusions about the direction or existence of causation, e.g., contradicting 
results of research on the relationship between the monetary base and economic 
growth or the threshold hypothesis (Stock & Watson, 1989; Maziarz, 2017). Second, 
the analysis of economists’ research practice indicates that it draws causal conclusions 
on the basis of premises unjustified from the perspective of modern philosophy of 
economics.  
There are frequent cases of making conclusions about the causal nature of 
a relationship based on observations of precedence over time, correlations or dif-
ferences in mean values in different subgroups of the studied population. Two 
case studies based on high-profile articles in recent years will be discussed below. 
The authors of these articles, basing on their econometric observations arrived at 
opposing conclusions. It is worth emphasizing that the results of the research have 
been used to justify the economic policy conducted by the governments that al-
lows presuming that they have been interpreted in terms of causality. The use of 
the research discussed below to make decisions on economic policy confirms 
Woodward’s observation that scientists interested in social sciences treat instru-
mentalist causality, naming such permanent relationships despite interventions 
(Woodward, 2003). 
The first case study will be based on the Reinhart-Rogoff (2010) case, which 
is misunderstood by previous commentators. Namely, this is not an error high-
lighted by Herndon, Ash and Pollin (2014), but the different research methods 
used by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) lead to different results (compare point 4.1). 
The second case study will be based on research on the truth of the expansionary 
fiscal contraction hypothesis, where, as in the previous case, Guajardo, Leigh 
& Pescatori (2010), and Alesina & Ardagna (2009) reached different conclusions. 
In addition, the analysis of economists’ research practice indicates that there 
are cases when they apply methodology grounded in the philosophy of economics 
in a manner not recommended by methodologists. An example of such a situation 
may be the Madrak-Grochowska and Żurek (2011) research, which used 
Granger’s causality tests to analyze the relationship between the time series of 
variation of returns on selected stock market indices, i.e. to study a phenomenon 
that, according to current theoretical knowledge, is not causative. It is worth not-
ing that the author of the method objected to such application of the causality test, 
arguing that this may lead to incorrect conclusions (Granger, 1969). Furthermore, 
practising economists often focus on one of the methods (theoretical deduction or 
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econometric analysis of correlations) resulting from the two main philosophical 
approaches to the problem of causality, which can also lead to wrong conclusions 
(Maziarz, 2015). 
4.1. The Reinhart-Rogoff affair 
The so-called Reinhart-Rogoff affair is a term applied to the discussion caused by 
the publication of two high-profile and influential articles. Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010), on the basis of their historic database containing some 3000 observations 
of the level of public debt to GDP ratio for 44 countries over nearly 200 years, 
presented results indicating the existence of a threshold in the relationship be-
tween the said indicator and the economic development rate. According to the 
threshold hypothesis formulated in the article, Growth in a Time of Debt (2010), 
public debt exceeding 90% of the public debt-to-GDP ratio significantly slowed 
economic growth.  
Their article was criticized by Herndon, Ash and Pollin (2014), who, after 
unsuccessful attempts to replicate and receive a spreadsheet used by Reinhart and 
Rogoff to perform calculations, indicated three errors: (1) the wrong formula in 
the spreadsheet (which omitted the first five countries in alphabetical order), 
(2) way of counting the average and (3) not including a time series representing 
New Zealand data in the database.  
It is worth noting that the only mistake is the incorrect specification of the 
formula adding up the cells in a spreadsheet, which led to the omission of 
the average economic development of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada and 
Denmark. The error did not significantly affect the estimated average values (dif-
ferences between 0.1 and 0.3 percentage points were noted). The other two errors 
pointed out by Herndon, Ash and Pollin rather deserve the name of different 
methodological choices, because there are arguments justifying the non-inclusion 
of the New Zealand debt time series and the weighted average use by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010).
1
 Considering the impact of alternative methodological choices on 
estimating the economic growth rate in four groups of countries / years separated 
due to the variation in the value of the public debt to GDP ratio, which is much 
larger than the role of the above-mentioned error (see Table 1), it can be conclud-
ed that—contrary to the previous comments present in the literature on the sub-
ject—the differences in results obtained by Reinhart & Rogoff (2010), and Hern-
don, Ash & Pollin (2014) are not a result of an error but due to different 
methodological choices. 
1 The autocorrelation and the phenomenon of debt overhangs, indicated in the literature on the subject, 
cause that using an unweighted arithmetic mean could lead to misleading results (Dafermos, 2015; 
Reinhart, Reinhart & Rogoff, 2012; cf. Maziarz, 2018). 
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Table 1. Average growth rates published by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and values obtained 
by Herndon, Ash and Pollin (2014) during the replication of their study 
Category: public debt to GDP 
Method < 30% 30%–60% 60%–90% > 90% 
Results corrected by  
Herndon, Ash and Pollin 
4.1 3.1 3.2 2.2 
Elements of replication 
Error in the spreadsheet 4.0 3.0 3.2 1.9 
A selective choice of years 4.2 3.1 3.2 1.9 
Weighted average 4.0 3.0 3.0 1.9 
Results published by  
Reinhart and Rogoff 
4.1 2.8 2.8 -0.1 
Note. Adapted from “Does high public debt consistently stifle economic growth? A critique of Reinhart and Rogoff,” 
by Th. Herndon, M. Ash & R. Pollin, 2014, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 38(2), 257–279. 
Although Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) formulating the hypothesis that “high 
debt/GDP levels (90 per cent and above) are associated with notably lower growth 
outcomes” they did not claim that their discovery is of a causal nature, but the 90%-
threshold hypothesis was interpreted in this way by many academic economists and 
economic politicians. The article Growth in a Time of Debt has been named by 
Krugman (2013), one of the most important economic analyzes of recent years. The 
results obtained by Reinhart and Rogoff deserved such a title thanks to the fact that 
their publications appeared during the financial crisis when issues of public debt size 
and its impact on economic growth gained importance in conjunction with the in-
creased indebtedness of many countries due to the necessity to finance rescue plans 
for bankrupt banks. The article has been cited in the US Republican budget and by 
Oli Rehn, European Commissioner for the Economy of the European Union. In 
addition, it was appealed to by many politicians, including Manuel Barroso, Angela 
Merkel and Wolfgang Schaube (Botsch, 2013; Smith, 2013). 
4.2. Research on the hypothesis of the expansionary fiscal contraction 
Considering the current opinion among some economists about the need to reduce 
the size of the public debt in many countries of the world, which, in response to 
the financial crisis, decided to implement stimulus packages financed by bond 
sales, the question is: when should budget cuts be made? The cliometry experts, 
who are investigating the expansionary fiscal contraction hypothesis, try to answer 
the question-is it better for the average pace of economic development to immedi-
ately limit public debt, or is it more fruitful to wait until the country leaves the 
recession? The hypothesis was formulated nearly three decades ago, but the ques-
tion of whether budget cuts have a positive impact on the pace of economic devel-
opment and in the short term, remains unanswered. 
As in the case of the contrasting results obtained in the two aforementioned 
studies, the opinions of economists about the short-term impact of budget cuts on 
economic growth are divided. Keynesians, believing in stable prices and wages in 
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the short term, argue that budget cuts contribute to a short-term recession (or 
a slowdown) resulting in a drop in aggregate demand. On the other hand, neoclas-
sical economists argue that reducing the deficit may have a positive impact on the 
pace of economic development even in the short term, due to the increase of 
the wealth of consumers (by reducing tax rates and the risk premium) and reduc-
tion of wages that positively affects competitiveness (Alesina & Perotti, 1996). 
Due to the alternative theoretical approaches, the research on the expansion-
ary fiscal contraction hypothesis has focused on the cliometrics analysis of the 
impact of reducing the deficit on economic growth in the past. The first step in 
such an analysis is to indicate the years when individual countries made budget 
cuts. Guajardo, Leigh and Pescatori (2010) decided to conduct their analysis based 
on the methodology developed by Romer and Romer (2007), who, in turn, 
based their research on fiscal shocks on the analysis of descriptive sources. 
Guajardo, Leigh and Pescatori (2010), using an action-based approach, analyzed 
OECD Economic Surveys, IMF Staff Reports, IMF Recent Economic Develop-
ments and other reports and government documents related to budget policy. Since 
econometric analysis of changes in the pace of economic development in the years 
following the budget-cuts identified, they concluded that the hypothesis of expan-
sionary fiscal contraction is not supportable. 
Alesina and Ardagna (2009) analyzed the years in which the cuts were made 
and changes in the volume of cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) to indi-
cate Cliometrics experts used the correction method developed by Blanchard (1990). 
After identifying the years when the adjusted budget deficit decreased by more than 
1.5% of GDP and analyzing changes in GDP in subsequent years, economists have 
concluded that the hypothesis of expansionary fiscal contraction is valid. 
The contradiction of the conclusions discussed above results from the use of 
different methods identifying the moments of budget cuts. An analysis of the years 
indicated in both articles shows that only 30% of budget cuts were identified by both 
methods at the same time (see Table 2). Both methodologies are widely used and 
supported by their followers making it difficult to choose one over the other (2018).  
The second similarity in these two studies is that economists, formulate their 
recommendations for economic policy on the analysis of historical relationships 
between time series. The article by Guajardo, Leigh and Pescatori (2010) was 
published in the report of the International Monetary Fund—World Economic 
Outlook, devoted to the current macroeconomic situation and ways to counteract 
the crisis. Authors explicitly support the recommendations formulated at the end of 
the article by Alesina and Ardagna, who advised the immediate reduction of the 
size of the budget deficit and public debt. On the other hand, Guajardo, Leigh and 
Pescatori using the cliometric observations recommended economic policies to 
refrain from budget reforms until the economies leave the recession. 
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Table 2. Comparison of years indicated as periods of budget cuts in selected countries. 
Country Guajardo, Leigh & Pescatori (2010) Alesina & Ardagna (2009) 
Australia 1986; 1987 1987; 1988 
Austria 1984; 1996; 1997; 2005 
Belgium 1982; 1983; 1987; 1993 1982; 1984; 1987; 2006 
Denmark 1983; 1984; 1985; 1986 1983; 1984; 1985; 1986; 2005 
Finland 1992; 1993; 1994; 1996; 1997; 1998 1981; 1984; 1988; 1994; 1996; 1998; 2000 
France 1996 
Greece 1986; 1991; 1994; 1996; 2005; 2006 
Spain 1986; 1987; 1994; 1996 
Netherlands 1983; 1988; 1991; 1993; 1996 
Ireland 1982; 1983; 1987; 1988; 2009 1984; 1987; 1988; 1989; 2000 
Japan 1997 1984; 1999; 2001; 2006 
Canada 1981; 1986; 1987; 1995; 1996; 1997 
Germany 1997 1996; 2000 
Norway 1980; 1983; 1989; 1996; 2000; 2004; 2005 
New Zeland 1987; 1989; 1993; 1994; 2000 
Portugal 1983; 2002 





Sweden 1983; 1993; 1995; 1996; 1997 
1981; 1983; 1984; 1986; 1987; 1994; 
1996; 1997; 2004 
Great 
Britain 
1981; 1997 1982; 1988; 1996; 1997; 1998; 2000 
Italy 1992; 1993; 1995; 1997 1980; 1982; 1990; 1991; 1992; 1997; 2007 
Note. Adapted from “It’s all in the eye of beholder,” by M. Maziarz, 2019, Argumenta Oeconomica (manuscript 
accepted for publication). 
5. Conclusions
The discrepancy between the philosophy of economics and the research practice 
of economists is particularly strong in the field of ontology and epistemology of 
causality and causal relations in the economy. The case studies discussed above 
show that economists make recommendations for economic politicians, i.e. they 
state the existence of causal relationships based on premises which—according to 
the contemporary philosophy of economics—are unjustifiable. On the other hand,   
modern philosophers who specialize in issues related to economics and social 
sciences and methodologists seem to draw normative conclusions that, due to their 
restrictiveness, cannot be observed while conducting research by economists.  
McCloskey (1998) strongly opposed the formulation rules limiting the free-
dom and ingenuity of scientists on the basis of methodological research. However, 
McCloskey recommended that the philosophers of science dealing with descrip-
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tive analyzes of research practice and ways of justifying their results, and the dis-
crepancy between the aforementioned studies on causality in the philosophy of 
economics and the methods of inference of causal relations by economists in the 
case studies discussed, it is possible to formulate research problems that have not 
yet been undertaken and analyzed exhaustively: 
(1) What research methods contemporary economists use to infer causal rela-
tions? 
(2) What philosophical assumptions are based on these methods? 
(3) Which of the philosophical theories of causality reflect the understanding 
of this term by economists? 
(4) Which of the paradigms of the philosophy of science best describes the ac-
tivities of economists? 
The solution to the above research problems through systematic research on 
the scientific practice of economists will allow us to understand the methods of 
investigating causal relationships used in research and their limitations. In addi-
tion, by applying—for example—the approach of reference semantics, i.e. at-
tempting to answer the question what features an economic reality would have 
had, what causal relations would have to be, that the methods used by economists 
would be appropriate, it would be possible to formulate conclusions on the ways 
of understanding causality by economists and an indication of these paradigms of 
philosophy of science and philosophical theories of causality that offer the greatest 
descriptive adequacy. 
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